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HOW NEW YORK RESTRICTS GIFTS FOR MASSES
KENNETH R. O'BRIENt DANIEL E. O'BRIEN* -
N Ew YORK imposes statutory restrictions on testamentary gifts for
Masses. These restrictions on gifts for Masses are not made in ex-
press terms. They flow from a general law which cuts down the right of
an owner of property to freely dispose of it by will for charitable uses.
The extent to which the States have gone in restricting the common-
law right of owners of property to freely dispose of their property to
charitable or religious uses is set forth by the American Law Institute
in Section 362 of the Restatement of Trusts (1935):
"b... In some States1 there are statutes limiting the proportion of a testa-
tor's estate which can be devised or bequeathed for charitable purposes. The per-
missible maximum varies in different States; in some it is one-half, in some one-
third, and in some one-fourth of the testator's estate. Usually the invalidity of
the disposition is made dependent on the survival of certain members of his
family such as wife or child, descendant of a child or parent. These statutes
are ordinarily construed to impose limitations on the power of the testator to
dispose of his property in order to protect the designated relatives, and only
those relatives can take advantage of the limitation.
"c. . In some States2 there are statutes which provide that' no devise or
bequest for a charitable purpose shall be valid if the will is executed within a
certain time prior to the death of the testator. The period varies in different
States; in some it is thirty days, in some ninety days, in some one year."
(note to c. "In the United States there are statutes in some States3 restricting
t Priest, Archdiocese of Los Angeles. I
* Member of the California Bar.
1. California (one-third if testator leaves legal heirs); Georgia (one-third if testator
leaves wife, child or descendants of child); Idaho (one-third if testator leaves lineal de-
scendants); Iowa (one-fourth if testator leaves a spouse, child, child of a deceased child,
or parent); Mississippi (one-third if testator leaves spouse, child, or descendant of child) ;
Montana (one-third); New York (one-half if testator leaves spouse, child, or descendant
or parent). ScoTt, TRusTs (1938) § 362.4, note 2. The New York statute is found in
N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 17.
2. California (thirty days); District of Columbia (one calendar month); Florida (six
months) ; Georgia (ninety days) ; Idaho (thirty days); Mississippi (ninety days) ; Montana
(thirty days where testator bequeaths more than one-third of the estate for charitable pur-
poses); Ohio (one year) ; Pennsylvania (thirty days). 3 ScoTr, TRusTs (1938) § 362.4, note 1.
O'Brien and O'Brien, Why Pennsylvania Restricts Gifts for Masses (1944) 48 DIcE. L.
REV. 179.
3. California, Kansas, Massachusetts, Montana, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Da-
kota and Utah. 3 ScoTT, TRUsTS (1938) § 362.4, note 3. Bodfish, The Destructive Effect of the
1937 Amendment of Section 42 of the Probate Code of California upon the Limitations
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the amount of property, real or personal, which may be held by a charitable
corporation. It is a question of interpretation of the statute whether, where
property in excess of the amount permitted to be transferred inter vivos or by
will to a charitable corporation, the objection can be made only by the State
or can be made by the settlor or his heirs or next of kin or residuary devisee.")
Louisiana restricts for all purposes gifts inter vivos or mortis causa of
a specified share of the donor's property with the view to protect the
donor from impoverishing himself during his lifetime and to protect his
children and parents. 4 By other statutes a surviving spouse is also pro-
tected.
The statutes of New York and the judicial decisions construing the
same will serve to illustrate generally the scope of statutory restrictions in
the United States on gifts for Masses. New York's basic statute5 re-
stricting charitable gifts was incorporated in chapter 360 of the Laws
of 1860, and provided:
"no person having a husband, wife, child, or parent, shall, by his or her last
will . . . devise or bequeath to any benevolent, charitable, literary, scientific,
religious, or missionary society, association, or corporation, in trust, or other-
wise, more than one-half part of his or her estate, after the payment of his
or her debts."
This basic statute and its subsequent amendments have been con-
strued by New York courts in the cases following.
Ruppel v. Schlegel' arose on a petition brought by the sister of the
testator for the construction of a will. Adam Schlegel died testate. His
will provided:
"Fifth: All the residue ... I give . . : to the Roman Catholic Church of the
Most Holy Trinity ... Brooklyn . . . but under the following ordination.
"a. That in each . . . year one high, mass shall be celebrated for my . . .
soul and also after the decease of my... wife, one high mass shall be celebrated
every year for the soul of my wife.
"b. And a part of the said estate shall be used ... to pay for poor students
intending to become Catholic priest(s) or Catholic teacher(s).
Regarding Testamentary Dispositions to Charity (1938) 26 CAMIF. L. REv. 309. Matter of
McGraw, 111 N. Y. 66, 19 N. E. 233, 2 L. R. A. 387 (1888) aff'd. sub nom. Cornell Uni-
versity v. Fiske, 136 U. S. 152, 10 Sup. Ct. 775, 34 L. ed. 427 (1890). The present New
York statute is in N. Y. GEN. CoRP. LAW § 15.
4. LA. REv. Cv. CODE (1940) §§ 1493-1497.
5. Now found in N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 17.
6. 55 Hun 183, 7 N. Y. Supp. 936 (Genl Term, 2d Dep't 1889).
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"c. And a part of said estate I ordain shall be used for starting a newspaper
for the interest of the Catholic people."
The testator left a widow, to whom he gave by the will a life estate
in his realty and personalty, and his sister and other heirs to whom he
left nothing. The value of the residue was more than one-half of the
estate.
The contesting sister litigated for the excess over the half. She con-
tended that the three clauses in the will, providing respectively (a) for
stipends for Masses, (b) for tuition for students for the Catholic priest-
hood or for Catholics aspiring to be teachers, and (c) for aid towards
the establishment of a Catholic newspaper, were subject to the statutory
inhibition of chapter 360 of Laws of 1860 restricting charitable gifts
to one-half of the estate, because they created charitable trusts. The
Surrogate held7 that the gift for Masses (as well as the other gifts) was
not within the statutory inhibition because a trust had not been created.
The Surrogate reasoned that the residue had been given absolutely to the
Church of the Most Holy Trinity and consequently there were no bene-
ficiaries and hence no one interested in the equitable title. The Sur-
rogate said:" ". the testator 'was trusting to the gratitude and gene-
rosity of the church to say the masses. . . .The testator knew it would
not cost the church anything to say the masses and so the church was not
directed to use any part of the estate for that purpose.'" The sister ap-
pealed to the New York Supreme Court and, at Special Term, judgment
against her was affirmed9 on the ground that no trust had been created
and that an absolute gift had been made to the church, though the gift
was subject to a condition subsequent. The sister appealed once again,
and at the General Term, the judgment was affirmed, 10 the Court saying:
"We concur in the reasons assigned by the Surrogate and the Court at
Special Term."" The Court gaVe as an alternate ratio decidendi:
"Courts of equity entertain jurisdiction over actions for the construction of
doubtful provisions in last *wills and testaments in behalf of beneficiaries,
executors, and trustees, but the plaintiff occupies no such position or relation.''
7. The opinion of the Surrogate will be found in 7 N. Y. Supp. 936 (Surr. Ct. 1886).
8. Id. at 937.
9. The judgment of the Supreme Court at Special Term is reported in 7 N. Y. Supp.
at 938 (1889).
10. 55 Hun 183, 7 N. Y. Supp. 936 (Gen1 Term, 2d Dep't 1889).
11. Id. at 185, 7 N. Y. Supp. at 938.
12. Id. at 184, Ibid.
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The New York courts were right in ruling that a trust had not been
created. The residue was the subject of a gift to the Church of the Most
Holy Trinity. An equitable charge on the gift to the church had been
created."3 This equitabl- charge (apart from any obligations for the
students and the newspaper) required the church 'to procure the saying
and application of an annual high Mass for the soul of the testator and
an annual high Mass for the soul of the testator's wife. The offerings,
as decreed by the Church in the proper diocesan statutes, for the two
Masses would probably, amount to $10.00 a year, though they might
be more in a few dioceses. The Surrogate was wrong in saying that the
church would not be obliged to make the offerings of $10.00, or more,
annually, for the Masses. The church would have to make these offer-
ings annually to .one or two priests. Mass stipends are always given to
the priests (in their individual capacities) who say such Masses, as gifts
towards their support.14
The gift to the Church of the Most Holy Trinity was unquestionably
to a "religious society" within the express terms of the statute. As such
gift, it did not have to be in trust in order to be within the resricting
statute, which inhibits devises or bequests "to any . . . religious . . .
society, in trust, or otherwise.... ." Assuming that the gift was for chad-
table uses, the sister should have prevailed in her claim for her part of
the estate in excess of one-half thereof, if a surviving sister could take
advantage of the statutory limitation.
Vanderveer v. McKane'5 arose on a proceeding brought by the execu-
tor for the construction of a will. Aletta M. Vanderveer died testate,
within two months after the execution of her will, leaving her father
surviving her. By the eleventh article in her will, the testatrix be-
queathed to her executors $5,500, to be paid over by them as therein
directed: $500 each to the pastors of certain Roman Catholic churches
in Brooklyn therein named, and $2 0 each to the pastors of certain other
Roman Catholic churches. The testatrix also gave for charitable uses
two other gifts, one of $15,000 and another of $5,000. Including the
13. Bogert says: "An equitable charge for charitable purposes may be created, and it
is to be distinguished from a trust." 2 BOcERT, TRusTs AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 324. See
also § 31. 1 Scour, TRusTs (1939) § 10 et seq.; RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 31;
Kenneth R. O'Brien, Foundations for Masses Should Never Create Trusts (1944) 4 TEn
JupsrT 284.
14. Kenneth R. O'Brien, The Parish Priest and The Federal Income Tax Under the
Revenue Act of 1942 (1943) 3 THE JUnIST 129.
15. 25 Abb. N. C. 105, 11 N. Y. Supp. 808 (Sup. Ct. 1890).
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gifts for Masses as gifts for charitable uses, the total of such gifts ex-
ceeded one-half of the estate. Excluding the gifts for Masses, the total
of the gifts for charitable uses was less than one-half of the estate. The
testatrix directed that the gifts of $500 and the gifts of $250 to the
various priests be made for Masses to be said in each of the named
churches for the repose of her own soul and the souls of her mother,
brother, and aunt.
The gifts for Masses and the other charitable gifts were attacked by
the father of the testatrix. He claimed the part of all these gifts which
was in excess of one-half of the estate. He contended that all the gifts
for charity were within the inhibition of chapter 360 of Laws of 1860.
He also contended that the bequests to such of the corporations named
as legatees as were incorporated under chapter 319 of the Laws of 1848
were void under the provision of that statute which declared that no
devise or bequest to any corporation formed thereunder should b6 valid
in any will which shall not have been made and executed at least two
months before the death of the testator. (Under this last contention
a gift to the Sisters of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul was declared
invalid.), The New York Supreme Court held that the bequests for
Masses were not within the statutory inhibition of chapter 360 of Laws
of 1860 on the ground that the bequests were not gifts to corporations,
but were gifts to individuals.
This decision was right under chapter 360 of Laws of 1860 before the
1923 amendment. The basic restricting statute did not inhibit gifts
to individuals. Bequests for Masses are always gifts to individual
priests-for their support, gifts on condition precedent that they say and
apply the Masses as requested by the donor. In the instant case, the
executor was made by the testatrix her donee of powers to distribute
Mass stipends to the various priests recommended by her.
Matter of Zimmerman16 was a proceeding upon probate of a will.
Sophia Zimmerman died testate. Her will provided:,
"... to the priest of St. Mary's Church, Lancaster, New York . . .
$600, for which masses shall be said for the repose of my soul. .... "
She was survived by a husband who was given $300. There were other
charitable gifts in the amount of $700. The total amount of the per-
sonal estate did not exceed $1,700.
The husband contested the bequest for Masses and contended, among
other things, that the bequest was in fact to St. Mary's Church, a re-
16. 22 Misc. 411, 50 N. Y. Supp. 395 (Surr. Ct. 1898).
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ligious society, and was, with the other gifts for charity, for more than
one-half of the estate, and void as to the excesi. The Surrogate held
that the bequest for Masses was valid, that it was not within the in-
hibition of the restricting statute, for the gift was to the priest, in his
individual capacity, and not to St. Mary's Church, a religious society.
Under the law before the 1923 amendment this decision was plainly
right. In the head-note the reporter states: ". . . nor is . . . a bequest
. . . to the priest ... for ... masges . . . a bequest for a religious pur-
pose. . . ' The opinion of Surrogate Marcus does not warrant this con-
clusion of the reporter.
Matter of Beck"7 was a case which arose on a request by executors for
the construction of a will in an accounting proceeding. Alphonse Beck
died testate. (The exact words of the pertinent provisions of the will
were not set forth in the report.) The testator bequeathed $5 to a son
and $100 to a nephew, and made gifts of somte pieces of jewelry to
friends. All the residue was given to a trustee, one-half for the purpose
of having Masses said, and the other half for the perpetual care of
the decedent's buiial lot. The decedent left a son and a grandson. The
jewelry had been itemized as to the pieces thereof, but no value had
been set on it.
By the time of this case, New York's basic restricting statute, chap-
ter 360 of Laws of 1860, had been amended by chapter 301 of Laws
of 1923, now Decedent Estate Law Section 17, by the addition of the
words "or purpose" after "society, association, or corporation," so as
to read:
. "No person having a husband, wife, child, or descendant or parent, shall,
by his or her last will and testament, devise or bequeath to any benevolent,
charitable, literary, scientific, religious or missionary society, association, cor-
poration or purpose, in trust or otherwise, more than one-half part of his or
her estate, after the payment of his or her debts .... "
This amendment was enacted to overcome the rule of law laid down in
Allen v. Stevens,' 8 to the effect that the old law did not restrict a testa-
mentary gift to individuals in trust for a charitable purpose.19
17. 130 Misc. 765, 225 N. Y. Supp. 187 (Surr. Ct. 1927).
18. 161 N. Y. 122, 55 N. E. 568 (1899).
19. "In New York prior to an amendment of the statute which added 'purpose' after
'society, association, or corporation,' the statute which in terms applied to gifts to certain
types of societies, associations, or corporations, in trust or otherwise, did not include a testa-
mentary gift to individuals in trust for a charitable purpose ndtwithstanding the will also
authorized, but did not compel, the trustee to create a corporation." 68 C. J. 553. "In
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The Surrogate in the Beck case declared: "the half given for the pur-
pose of having masses said is a gift for a religious use." He also declared
that the other half had been given for "charitable and benevolent uses."
He made no determinate finding in the case, however, for, as he said:
"No finding as to whether or not there has been a violation of section 17
and no decree of construction and distribution can be made until the
amount is corrected to show the value of all the jassets of the estate."
The fact of the value of the jewelry once determined, the Surrogate
was very positive as to the law to be applied to the facts. He said:
"The value of the balance on hand should then be divided in half and the
amount bequeathed for the purposes above set forth is not permitted to exceed
more than one-half so ascertained .... So much as then remains of. the per-
sonalty and the realty is distributable and descends to the same persons who
would have received it if the decedent had died intestate."
The Surrogate was unequivocally of the opinion that the bequest
for Masses was within the inhibition of the restricting statute as a gift
to an individual in trust for a religious use. This decision is right. A
Mass stipend is always for the support of the priest who says and applies
the Mass as requested by the donor, and thus is for the advancement
of religion. The gift, being for a charitable use, did not, however, have
to be in trust to be within the inhibition of the restricting statute.
Matter of Brown ° was a proceeding by an executor for the settling of
his account. Ella Brown died testate. According to the report of the
case, "Mrs. Brown, so far as here material, gave a legacy of $500 to the
pastor of St. John's Church ... Brooklyn, 'to be used for the saying of
masses for the repose of the souls of myself and of my husband' ". She
gave contingent life estates to her husband and uncle in a trust fund
of $12,000 and to her uncle in an additional trust fund of $8,000 and
divided the entire residue between St. John's College and St. Joseph's
Home. The value of the personal estate, after payment of debts, amount-
ed to $36,574.20, and her real estate to $1,738.34. She left a husband.
She was also survived by an uncle and an aunt. The husband died
shortly thereafter. Two surviving sisters of the husband were appointed
1923 the Legislature gave increased vigor to the statute by adding the word 'purposes'
so as to overcome the effect of the decision in Allen v. Stevens." Matter of Blumenthal,
124 Misc. 850, 854, 208 N. Y. Supp. 682, 686 (Surr. Ct. 1925), aff'd on reargument,
126 Misc. 603, 215 N. Y. Supp. 142 (Surr. Ct. 1926). "Obviously, such legislative enact-
ment was to overcome the rule of law laid down in Allen v. Stevens." matter of Merritt,
124 Misc. 709, 716, 209 N. Y. Supp. 243, 249 (1925).
20. 135 Misc. 611, 238 N. Y. Supp. 160 (Surr, Ct. 1929).
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administratrices of his estate. They filed objections to the account of the
executor of the will of Ella Brown.
The administratrices contended that the bequest for Masses was a chari-
table bequest within the terms of the inhibition in the Decedent Estate
Law and that all the charitable gifts amounted to more than one-half of
the estate of Mrs. Brown. The Surrogate ordered the executor of Mrs.
Brown's estate to pay the bequest of $500 to the pastor of St. John's
Church, declaring that the bequest for Masses was not within the terms
of the Decedent Estate Law for the reason that the bequest for Masses
was not a charitable bequest. The ratio decidendi of the Surrogate was
erroneous. A Mass stipend is always for a charitable use. It is always
for the support of a priest. It is thus for the advancement of religion.
The advancement of religion is a charitable purpose.
I In New York, prior to the amendment of the statute, which added
the words "orpurpose" after "society, association, or corporation",
the courts had no difficulty in holding that the ordinary bequest for
Masses was not within the inhibition of the restricting statute. Subsequent
to said amendment, however, the New York courts have become con-
fused.21 A tendency has developed for some courts to effectuate the in-
tention of testators even though, in order to do so, recourse must be
had to false reasoning. An example of this unhealthy judicial policy is
seen in Matter of Brown, where the Surrogate, assuming that the re-
stricting statute would cut down a bequest for Masses, if ruled chari-
table, resorted to the device of declaring that a bequest for Masses
is not for a charitable use. This stand is directly opposed to the teach-
ings and law of the Church22 and is not justified simply to give full
effect to a bequest for Masses. The statement of the Surrogate in the
Brown case that a bequest for Masses is not for a charitable use has little
support at the present time in common law. He said: "The conten-
tion that the bequest for Masses to the pastor of St. John's Church is
a charitable bequest within the terms of the statute cannot be sus-
tained."'  He cited Matter of Zimmerman2 4 and Matter of Rywolt 25
in support thereof. These last two cases do not support the Surrogate's
21. ". . . subsequent to the above amendment, the cases are apparently not in accord
as to the application of the statute to gifts for masses." 68 C. J. 554, note 11.
22. Kenneth R. O'Brien, 'Bequests for Masses Rarely Create Charitable Trusts (1943)
3 THE JURIST 416.
23. 135 Misc. 611, 612, 238 N. Y. Supp. 160, 162 (Surr. Ct. 1929).
24. 22 Misc. 411, 413,,414, 50 N. Y. Supp. 395, 396, 397 (Surr. Ct. 1898).
25. 81 Misc. 103, 104, 142 N. Y. Supp. 1066, 1067 (Surr. Ct. 1929).
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statement. They stand for the proposition that bequests for Masses go
to priests in their individual capacities. The Surrogate did not under-
stand that Mass stipends, though they go to, priests, are always for the
support of priests, thus advance religion, and are charitable.
In view of the fact that the Beck case and the Brown case are in sharp
disagreement on the point as to whether or not bequests for Masses are
for religious or charitable uses, it may serve a good judicial purpose if
this point is carefully reexamined and analyzed.
It is submitted that gifts for Masses are always for a charitable use
in New York. They are for a charitable use because they advance a
religion tolerated by the State of New York. They advance a religion
tolerated by the State because they are used for the support of priests
of the Roman Catholic religion, the doctrines of which, under the
American principle of freedom of religion, can be lawfully followed.
What is a charitable use is a question of law. Is a specific use charitable
is a question of fact. The constituents of the concept "charitable use"
have tended to become more inclusive in the course of time. From the
date of hi' creation, man has been endowed by God with certain charita-
ble directives. He was impelled to give alms or to do acts for the relief
of the physically needy. He was impelled to give alms or to do acts
for the relief of the spiritually needy. The coercion of the natural law
required these things. The commandments of the Church demanded
them.
The relief of the spiritually needy in England in the twelfth, thirteenth,
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was administered by the-Church, the
Roman Catholic Church. There was no other. This was, in a way, or-
ganized charity. The individual did not effect relief to the spiritually
needy by giving alms directly, but he did give the alms to the Church,
as a moral entity, for the promotion of religion, or to the priests of the
Church for their support in order that they might be enabled to perform
their religious duties, so that in both cases spiritual comfort would be
given generally to the people and specifically to the individual. There
was no difficulty then, in finding as fact, that the giving of alms in these
ways was always charitable.
The determination of these cases in England began to become un-
certain towards the end of the reign of Henry VIII during the years he
contested with the Pope for the supremacy of the church in England.
However, it is submitted that even up to the time of the death of
Henry VIII the giving of alms for the support of the Church in England
19441
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and for the support of Roman Catholic priests was charitable, as matter
of fact.
During the reign of Edward VI, the successor of Henry VIII, for the
first time in England there came into existence a religion other than the
Roman Catholic religion. By enactment of Parliament, approved by
Edward VI, the Mass, without which the Roman Catholic religion
admittedly would be "a mere husk," was ordered not to be included in
the new religion and the communion service was substituted therefor.
Immediately thereafter there were two different religions in England,
one the Roman Catholic religion, the other the Anglican, the now State
religion. The Anglican became the established religion, the Roman
Catholic religion was simply tolerated. Gifts by the adherents of the
Anglican religion to their Church and to their ministers for their sup-
port were undoubtedly charitable. So also were the gifts by Roman
Catholics to their Church and for the support of their priests. No ques-
tions were raised in English courts during this period as to -the validity
of either of these propositions.
On the death of Edward VI the Roman Catholic religion temporarily
displaced the Anglican in royal favor. But shortly afterwards, when
Elizabeth came to the throne, the Anglican Church was reinstated as the
established church. By the Acts of Uniformity, in 1549 and 1559, the
celebration of the Mass was no longer tolerated. It became illegal
and, later, in 1581, it was a penal offence for a priest to say Mass and
a penal offence for a layman to attend Mass and these two acts con-
tinued to be crimes until 1791, and it was not until the Catholic Relief
Act, in 1829, that the Roman Catholic Church was again given the status
of being tolerated in England.
In 1601, shortly before Queen Elizabeth died, Parliament enacted
what is now well known as the Statute of Charitable Uses.2  This
statute authorized the Anglican bishops of every diocese and certain
others to -investigate cases where property had been given for charita-
ble purposes, and to make such orders, judgments and decrees as should
be necessary to carry out the purposes for which the donors had given
the property, which orders, judgments and decrees were to be valid until
altered by the chancellor. In short the statute provided machinery for
the enforcement of charitable trusts. The statute, however, soon fell
into disuse. But its preamble, containing an enumeration of charitable
purposes, was to exert judicial influence for centuries.
26. 1 Stat. 43 Eliz. c. 4 (1601).
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In this enumeration of charitable purposes, advancement of religion
was not included. The draftsman of the Act, Sir Francis Moore ex-
plained this omission as follows:
"... the gifts intended to be employed upon purposes grounded upon charity,
might, in change of times (contrary to the minds of the givers) be confiscated
into the king's treasury. For religion being variable, according to the pleasure
of succeeding princes, that which at one time is held to be orthodox, may at
another be accounted superstitious, and then such lands are confiscated. '"27
The Statute, inter alia, classified, as charitable, gifts for the "repair
of ... churches. . . ." This was its only enumeration of what gifts for
the advancement of religion were charitable. The Statute declares that
among the charitable purposes are:
"... some for relief of aged, impotent and poor people; some for maintenance
of sick and maimed soldiers and marines; schools of learning, free schools, and
scholars in universities; some for repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways,
churches, sea-banks and highways; some for education and preferment of
orphans, some for or towards relief, stock or maintenance for houses of correc-
tion; some for marriages of poor maids, some for supportation, aid and help
of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen and persons decayed, and others for relief
or redemption of prisoners or captives, and for aid or ease of any poor inhabit-
ants concerning payments of fifteens, setting out of soldiers and other taxes."
It was plain that the Statute of Charitable Uses, though by its ex-
press terms it delimited as charitable, gifts for the relief of the spir-
itually needy, to the "repair of churches," did extend the fact-field of
charitable gifts beyond those found by the ordinary processes of the
mind. For example, where reason formerly would not classify a con-
tribution for the repair of a port as charitable, now the fact-finder by
law would be required to declare such a contribution charitable.
In a short time after its enactment the judiciary began to supply
the omissions of the legislature in the matter of gifts for the advance-
ment of religion. In 1639 it was held in the case of Pember v. Inhabitants
of Knighton,28 that a gift to support a preaching minister of the estab-
lished church was charitable.
The English courts, of course, did not declare gifts for the support
of priests of the Roman Catholic faith or of rabbis of the Jewish
faith, religions not tolerated by the law, as charitable.
27. MoorE, Readings Upon The Statute of 43 Elizabeth, in DUKE, LAW OF CHARITABLE
USES (1805) 125.
28. DUKE, LAW OF CHAPiTABLE USES (1805) 381.
1944]
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In 1754 in the case of Da Costa v. De Pas,' a Jew left by will a cer-
tain sum to be applied toward establishing a Jesuba or assembly for read-
ing the Jewish law and instructing the people in the Jewish religion.
The court ruled that the gift-was not charitable, deciding that an illegal
trust had been created, and decreed that the king might apply the fund
under the doctrine of cy pres to other charitable purposes. Accordingly,
practically the whole fund was applied to the support of a minister of
the established religion. This was an outrageous decision.
In 1935 an English court in the case of West v. Shuttleworth,30
decided that a bequest for Masses was illegal as a superstitious use and
of course not charitable.
In 1862 in the case of Thornton v. Howe,3 still another English court
held that a gift of property to be applied to the "propagation of the sacred
writings of the late Joanna Southcote," a person who had declared that
she was with child by the Holy Ghost and that she was to give birth
to a second Messiah, but who had died without issue, was charitable.
In 1919, although the Houseof Lords, 'in Bourne v. Keane,32 over-
ruling West v. Shuttleworth, decided that gifts for Masses were not
void as being superstitious, failed to decide whether or not such gifts
were charitable.
In 1934, however, it was held in England in In re Cau ,33 that a gift
for Masses was for a charitable use. The case was tried on-the theory
that the testator, Father Caus, 'had created a trust which would be void
as in violation of the rule against perpetuities unless the gift were saved
as being for a charitable purpose. The statement of Dr. Delaney, filed
as a supplementary answer in the case of Attorney-General v. Delaney,'
was admitted by agreement as evidence in the trial of the case, first as
to the nature of the Mass, and secondly as to the nature of the money
received by the priest who says the Mass. The attorney for the heirs
contended that there was no authority in favor of the proposition that
the bequest was charitable and argued that West v. Shuttleworth, to the
effect that a gift for Masses was not charitable, applied. The Attorney-
General, for the will, argued that the gift was charitable on the ground
that it was for the advancement of religion, and that it was for the ad-
29. 1 Amb. 228, 27 Eng. Rep. Repr. 150 (1754).
30. 2 Myl. & K. 684, 39 Eng. Rep. Repr. 1106 (1835).
31. 31 Beav. 14, 54 Eng. Rep. Repr. 1042 (1862).
32. [1919] A. C. 815.
33. (Lindeboom v. Camille) [1934] Ch. 162.
34. I. R. 10 C. L. 174 (1877).
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vancement of religion in two ways: first, it enabled Masses, ritual acts
of religion, to be performed, which benefited the whole body of faith-
ful Catholics; second, it provided for the support of the priests who
would say the Masses. He then cited the Irish case of O'Hanlon v.
Logue5 to sustain his arguments.
The Court held that the gifts were charitable and that as the trust
was therefore a charitable trust it was not void as being contrary to
the rule against perpetuities. Luxmore, J. said:
"In my judgment, once the true nature of/ the Mass is explained, and the
destination and object of the payment for it is made clear, there can be no
room for any other opinion but that the gift for Masses is charitable, and'
that the contrary view expressed in West v. Shuttleworth . . . is based upon
insufficient and incorrect information with regard to the character of the rite,
and the nature and purpose of the payment. In my view the decision in West
v. Shuttleworth that a gift for the saying of Masses is not a charitable gift
is not correct and is contrary to the whole current of authority with regard
to, gifts for the advancement of religion....
"I have no hesitation in holding that a gift for the saying of Masses consti-
tutes a valid charitable gift, on the grounds, first, that it enables a ritual
act to be performed which is recognized by a large proportion of Christian
people to be the central act of their religion, and secondly, because it assists
in the endowment of priests whose duty it is to perform that ritual act. On each
of these grounds religion is advanced. . .. "3,1
The decision in the Caus case that gifts for Masses are charitable
because they advance religion is correct. It is submitted, however, that
the second ground given by the court for the decision is a sufficient one.
The first grouhd really expresses the motive of the, gift. The second
ground expresses the use to which the gift is to be put. Religion is ad-
vanced because the gift is to be used for the support of priests.
The court did not distinguish between the motive of the gift and the
use to which the gift was to be put. Father Caus's motive in making the
gift was to obtain the celebration and application of Masses for the repose
of his soul in the hope that thereby he might obtain from God through
the intercession of Christ, the principal minister of the Mass, and
through the sacrifice of the priest, the amelioration of any punishment
due to his sins. The Catholic belief in the propitiatory effect of the Mass,
coupled with his belief in the doctrine of Purgatory and the com-
munion of saints, would give him confidence that the sacrifice would not
35. [1906] 1 I. R. 247, 260, 261.
36. [19341 Ch. 162, 169.
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be offered for his intention in vain. Father Caus's gift was to be used to
provide support for priests who would celebrate Mass for the faithful
and perform other obligations of their sacred office.
The difference between the motive and the purpose of an act is illus-
trated as, to justice and charity respectively by two parables from the
Bible.
[Justice] "And he spoke also a parable to them, that we ought always to
pray, and not to faint, saying: there was a judge in a certain city, who feared
not God, nor regarded man. And there was a certain widow in that city, that
she came to him, saying: Avenge me of my adversary. And he would not for a
long time. But afterwards he said within himself: Although I fear not God,
nor regard man, yet because this widow is troublesome to me, I will avenge
her, lest continually coming she weary me."'3
The purpose of the judge's act in this parable was to do justice. But
his motive was to obtain personal relief from being nagged by the widow.
[Charity] "And he said to them: Which of you shall have a friend, and
shall go to him at midnight, and shall say to him: Friend, lend me three
loaves, becase'a friend of mine is come off his journey to me, and I have not
what to set before him. And he from within should answer, and say: Trouble
me not, the door is now shut, and my children are with me in bed; I cannot
rise and give thee. Yet if he shall continue knocking, I say to you, although he
will not rise and give-him, because he is his friend; yet, because of his impor-
tunity, he will rise, and give him as many as he needeth. '2 8
The motive of the householder in getting up in the middle of the night
and giving the bread to the one who requested it was to be relieved
from the persistent solicitations, though the purpose of the gift was
charitable in that it helped the needy.
Examples of gifts in which the motive is one thing and the purpose
another are very common in the every day affairs of life and are especially
numerous in matters of taxation. A donor may make contributions for
charitable purposes with the motive that by obtaining thereby deduc-
tions from his gross income, the tax on his net income will be lessened.
A donor may even make contributions for charitable purposes with the
motive of advancing his political fortunes.
Just as motive is immaterial in the law of gifts, so also is motive im-
material in the law of sales and in the law of contracts. Willistono
distinguishes consideration from motive in contracts as follows:
37. Luke 18: 1-14.
38. Luke 11: 1-13.
39. Wm=sToN, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1936) § 111.
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"Though desire to obtain a consideration for a promise may be and ordinarily
is, the motive inducing the promisor to enter into a contract, yet this is not
essential nor, on the other hand, can any motive serve in itself as consideration.
[citing cases] Thus, A may be moved by friendship to agree to sell his horse
to B for one hundred dollars. If there is an actual agreement to make the ex-
change of the horse for money, there will be a contract though A's motive for
entering into the transaction was friendship. . . On the other hand, if there
be no legal consideration, no motive, such as love and respect, or friendship for
another, or a desire to do justice, or fear of trouble, or a desire to equalize the
shares in an estate, or to provide for a child, or regret for having advised an.
unfortunate investment, will support a promise. There is a distinction be-
tween the consideration of the Common Law and the causa of the Roman Law.
Consideration is a present exchange bargained for in return for a promise. Causa
is some adequate reason for making a promise, and may be either a present ex-
change or an existing state of facts. As the Civil Law is in force in Louisiana,
the requirement of consideration does not there obtain."
The Mass case differs from the ordinary gift case where the motive
of the donor is immaterial. In the Mass case the motive becomes all
important, not as motive, but as condition precedent,0 for these two
always coalesce. Just as in the ordinary contract, the desire to obtain
the consideration for a promise is the motive inducing the promisor to
enter into the contract and just as in the ordinary sale desire to obtain
the property for the purchase price is the motive inducing the buyer to
purchase, so the desire to obtain the performance of the condition prece-
dent, viz., the saying of the Masses, is always-and in the Mass case there
is no exception-the motive inducing the offerer to make the gift to
the priest.
In the Mass case the motive, immaterial in the ordinary Common
Law gift, always rises to and equals a condition precedent to the vesting
of the title to the Mass-money, a phase that must always be reckoned
with in Common Law, Civil Law, and Canon Law. The nagging widow
parable was not a case of the transfer of property by gift or otherwise
and the motive therein did not rise to the status of condition precedent.
The midnight-knocker parable was a case of a transfer of title to prop-
40. O'Brien and O'Brien, Canon 829 Does Not Modify the Gift on Condition Precedent
of a Mass Stipend (1944) 4 THE JUaisr 133. "The nature and effect of a gift, not its
motive, determines its legal character. . . . The . . . donor's . . . motive . . . may be the
hope through masses to obtain some benefits for his soul. . . . Courts cannot look to
such motive, but must confine their attention to the nature of the gift and the objects to
be obtained by it. [citing cases]." ZoLLmAm, Am cA_ LAw oF CHuaSTxES (1924) 131.
See REsTATFAMNT, TRusts (1935) § 368(d): "Motive of Settlor Immaterial."
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erty where the motive did not rise to the status of coidition precedent.
The intention of the householder was that title to the loaves should pass
on delivery and he obtained his mental relief at the time of the delivery.
Therefore in the Caus case the motive of obtaining the Masses was
immaterial in the Common Law, while the obtaining of the Masses as
a condition precedent had binding force both at Common Law and Canon
Law insofar as the vesting of the title to the Mass-money was concerned.
The motive was collateral and the nature of the Mass was irrelevant
* in the determination of the fact as to whether or not the use to which
the gift to the priest was to be made was charitable. In the trial of
cases involving gifts for Masses, where the charitable use of the gift
is the issue, so long as the Roman Catholic religion is at least "toler-
ated" by the law, the nature of the stipend to the priest only, and not
the nature of the Mass, is relevant.
The Caus case definitely settled the law in England that gifts for
Masses are always for a charitable use.
The great weight of authority in the United States is that gifts for
Masses are always for a charitable purpose. All those States which de-
clare that bequests for Masses are valid as charitable trusts necessarily
hold that'gifts for Masses are for a charitable use.
In 1788 the legislature of New York formally declared 4 that the
English statute 43 Elizabeth was without force in that State. The pur-
pose of the legislature was to hbrogate the prevailing system of charita-
ble trusts with their indefinite beneficiaries. New York, in 1784, had
laid the foundation of a policy not to introduce any system of public
charities except through the medium of corporate bodies, and in that
year enacted its basic law for the incorporation of religious and chari-
table societies. "Charity as a great interest of civilization and Christian-
ity . . . suffered no loss or diminution in the change . . .made."4' 2
The legislature eliminated the legal instrument of the charitable trust
as a valid conduit for the dispensing of charities to indefinite beneficiaries,
but it had no intention of cutting down the scope of the fact-field of
charitable uses or purposes, and gifts for the advancement of religion
in the State of New York have always been liberally construed to be
for charitable purposes. The Court of Appeals of New York, as early
as 1888, in the case of Holland v. Alcock,4 ruled that a gift for Masses
41. N. Y. Laws 1788, c. 46, § 37.
42. Rappolo, J. in Holland v. Alcock, 108 N. Y. 312, 336, 16 N. E. 305, 316 (1888).
43. 108 N. Y. 312, 16 N. E. 305 (1888).
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is for a charitable use, as one for the advancement of religion, though
it held the gift to be invalid as one in trust for indefinite beneficiaries.
Later, in 1919, the Court of Appeals in Matter of Morris44 declared that
gifts for "Masses are ...public charities." In 1893 the legislature of
New York had enacted laws 5 practically restoring the common-law
doctrines of charitable trusts by providing that indefiniteness of bene-
ficiaries did not invalidate charitable devises and bequests in general.
Bequests for Masses, as gifts for a charitable purpose, are squarely
within Section 17 of the Decedent Estate Lawas amended in 1923:
c... no person having a husband, wife, child or descendant or parent shall
by his or her last will and testament, devise or bequeath to any.. . charitable
...purpose, in trust or otherwise, more than one-half of his or her estate,
after the payment of his or her debts, and such devise or bequest shall be
valid to the extent of one-half, and no more. ...."
It is quite certain that the New York Legislature, when it amended
section 17 of the Decedent Estate Law by chapter 301, Laws of 1923,
by adding after the word "corporation" the words "or purpose" did
not do so for the purpose of cutting down the scope of gifts for Masses,
which theretofore had not been within the terms of the restricting statute.
In the Mass bequest cases which had come before the courts of the
State of New York, the amounts of the bequests were not of sufficient
44. 227 N. Y. 141, 144, 124 N. E. 724, 725 (1919). As late a 1941, in Matter of Breck-
woldt, 176 Misc. 549, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 938 (1941), Wingate, S. said: "The suggestion
that a gift of this variety partakes of the nature of a 'public charity' naturally precipitates
the question whether it is to be included in the aggregate of charitable gifts under a will
for the purpose of determining whether its composite provisions offend against the inhibition
contained in section 17 of the Decedent Estate Law, which provides that testators who are
survved by certain specified dose relatives may not give more than one-half of their
net estates to charity if such relatives object to such a course. In every instance in which
this issue has been raised, the determination has been in the negative. (Matter of Zimmer-
man, 22 Misc. 411, 413, 414, 50 N. Y. Supp. 395, 396, 397 (Surr. Ct. 1898). Matter of
Rywoldt, 81 Misc. 103, 104, 142 N. Y. Supp. 1066, 1067 (Surr. Ct. 1929). Matter of Brown,
135 Misc. 611, 612, 238 N. Y. Supp. 160 (Surr. Ct. 1929). This result appears sound.
Whereas such a gift may be made, to a religious society it is not for a general religious
purpose since its object is not to promote religion as a whole, but according to the tenets
of the Roman Catholic and Jewish faiths, to secure for the testator a particular indi-
vidual benefit, by promoting the eternal welfare of his soul." The Surrogate went out of
his way to drop this confused and erroneous dictum. The Surrogate did not know the
pertinent tenets of the Roman Catholic relation nor the nature of the Mass stipend. He
was unable to distinguish between the motive of the offering and the purpose of the' gift.
45. N. Y. PERs. PRop. LAW § 12; N. Y. REAL PRop. LAW § 113.
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size46 to warrant any feeling that social interests or individual interests
were being impaired by permitting testators to continue the exercise of
freedom to dispose as they wished of their property to charity. Common
law early recognized as a legal right the interest of the individual ownei
to dispose of his property by will for charitable purposes, generally
as he wished. It did not recognize as a right the claim of any relative
to an interest in the property either during the lifetime of the owner or
upon his death.
Two Surrogates had declared that, prior to the amendment of the
statute, gifts to priests for Masses were not restrictable by the statute.
The fact that the New York legislature did not intend to restfict gifts
for Masses by the amendment of 1923 is of no avail.
"In construing statutes, we resort to the natural significance of their words
and if they bear a definite meaning, and the language is precise, we give effect
to the law as expressed. We should not indulge in conjecture as to intention,
if an intention is clearly expressed in the language; for the language of a statute
is presumed to declare the intention. '47
Nor, on the other hand, is the fact that the New York legislature did
not expressly intend to reduce the number of law suits contesting the
validity of bequests for Masses when it amended Section 17 of the
Decedent Estate Law 8 by Chapter 229'of the Laws of 1929, Section 3,
effective September 1, 1930, of any avail to disgruntled heirs. This
amendment provided: "The validity of a devise or bequest for more
than one-half may be contested only by a surviving husband, wife,
child, descendant or parent."
If the surviving husband, wife, child, descendant or parent elect not
to contest, bequests for Masses, as well as all other charitable gifts are
not restricted by Section 17 of the Decedent Estate Law. If a spouse,
parent or descendant should successfully contest excess charitable gifts,
other heirs, who had no right to contest, might share as in intestate
property."49
It is submitted that the New York restricting statute as amended, more
nearly approaches the natural law than restricting laws of other States.
Natural law secures the right of certain relatives under special cir-
46. See infra, Appendix.
47. Gary, J. in Allen v. Stevens, 161 N. Y. 122, 153, 55 N. E. 568, 577 (1899).
48. Section 18 of the Decedent Estate Law gives a surviving spouse a right of elec-
tion to take against the will his or her share of the estate as in intestacy.
49. Matter of Sonderling, 157 Misc. 231, 283 N. Y. Supp. 568 (1935).
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.cumstances to be free from want and restricts generally the power of a
head of a family to make gifts outside his immediate family-and this
restriction does not except gifts for Masses. From the view-point of the
present Church law this is not a matter of positive (man-made) law, at
least de iure condito, whatever it might be de iure condendo. ° But




NEw YORK CASES OF BEQUESTS FOR MASSES: BEQUESTS
Matter of Hagenmeyer, 12 Ab. N. C. 432 (1883) $100 and uncertain residue
Holland v. Alcock, 108 N. Y. 312, 16 N. E. 305 (1888) $11,500
Schwartz v. Bruder, 6 Dem. 169, 3 N. Y. Supp. 134 (1888) 500
O'Conner v. Gifford, 117 N. Y. 275, 22 N. E. 1036 (1889) 500
Matter of Black, 1 Con. 477, 5 N. Y. Supp. 452 (1889) 500
Ruppel v. Schlegel, 55 Hun 183, 7 N. Y. Supp. 936 (1889) unknown
Vanderveer v. McKane, 25 Ab. N. C. 105, 11 N. Y. Supp. 808 (1890) 5,500
Estate of Julia Howard, 5 Misc. 295, 25 N. Y. Supp. 111 (1893) 600
Matter of Backes, 9 Misc. 504, 30 N. Y. Supp. 394 (1894) 650
Matter of Zimmerman, 22 Misc. 411, 50 N. Y. Supp. 395 (1898) 600
Morris v. Hughes, 45 Misc. 278, 92 N. Y. Supp. 288 (1904) 1,000
Matter of Mary J. McAvoy, 112 App. Div. 377, 98 N. Y. Supp. 437 (1906) 800
Matter of Eppig, 63 Misc. 613, 118 N. Y. Supp. 683 (1909) 2,500
Matter of Rywolt, 81 Misc. 103, 142 N. Y. Supp. 1066 (1913) 1,000
Matter of Catherine Welch, 105 Misc. 27, 172 N. Y. Supp. 349 (1918) 100
Morris v. Edwards, 227 N. Y. 141, 124 N. E. 724 (1919) 6,000
(total for funeral expenses, masses and tombstone)
Matter of Dwyer, 192 App. Div. 72, 182 N. Y. Supp. 64 (1920)
Matter of Beck, 130 Misc. 765, 225 N. Y. Supp. 187 (1927)
Matter of Brown, 135 Misc. 611, 238 N. Y. Supp. 160 (1929)
Matter of Werrick, 135 Misc. 876, 239 N. Y. Supp. 740 (1930)
Matter of Cunningham, 140 Misc. 91, 249 N. Y. Supp. 439 (1931)
Matter of McArdle, 147 Misc. 876, 264 N. Y. Supp. 764 (1933)
Matter of Abraham Stephen, 150 Misc. 27, 269 N. Y. Supp. 614 (1934)
Matter of Semenza, 159 Misc. 487, 288 N. Y. Supp. 556 (1936)
Matter of Breckwoldt, 176 Misc. 549, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 938 (1941)
Matter of DeMolina, - Misc. -, 35 N. Y. S. (2d) 24 (1942)












50. Consult O'Brien and O'Brien, Gifts for Masses Are Restricted
and Church Laws (1944) 17 So. CALiF. L. REv. 144.
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